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pAbstract: To mitigate the impact of the 2008–2010 global financial crisis on
vulnerable households, the Government of Latvia established Workplaces with
Stipends, an emergency public works program that targeted registered unemployed
people who were not receiving unemployment benefits. This paper evaluates the
targeting performance and welfare impacts of the program. The paper employs a
quasi-experimental estimation strategy and analyzes a unique household survey. The
authors find that the Latvian public works program was successful at targeting poor
people, and leakage of benefits to non-poor households was small. Using propensity
score matching, the authors find that the program’s stipend mitigated the impact of
job loss and raised participating household incomes by 37 percent relative to similar
households not benefiting from the program. The paper also finds that the forgone
income for this program was less than forgone incomes estimated in other
countries.
JEL codes: I38, J64, J68
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Latvia was one of the hardest hit countries in the world during the 2008–2010 global
financial crisis; during 2008–2010, Latvia’s gross domestic product (GDP) contracted
by 21 percent. During 2009 alone, GDP contracted by 18 percent (Figure 1a). Poverty
rates increased by eight percentage points - from 10.1 percent in 2008 to 18.1 percent
in 2009 (Ajwad et al. 2012). Net job creation was negative as layoffs rose sharply. Be-
tween 2008 and 2010, 126,000 jobs were lost, equivalent to 11.2 percent of the pre-
crisis workforce. In 2008 Q3, unemployment rates began to rise and reached a peak of
about 21 percent in 2010 Q1, compared to about six or seven percent in the pre-crisis
2007–08 period (Figure 1b).
In September 2009, in response to rapidly rising unemployment rates, the Government
of Latvia introduced an emergency public works program known as the Workplaces with
Stipends (WWS) program, darba praktizēana, simtlatnieku programma, or the 100-Lats
-programma.1 The program’s goal was to strengthen Latvia’s relatively weak social safety
net in response to the unprecedented drop in economic activity and rapidly rising pov-
erty.2 Specifically, the public works program created temporary labor-intensive employ-
ment for people who were unemployed but were ineligible for unemployment benefits.
This paper evaluates the impact of Latvia’s emergency public works program on miti-
gating the impact of the 2008–2010 global financial crisis on households. We employ aAzam et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,



















































































































































Figure 1 Economic growth and unemployment rates in Latvia. (a) Real GDP growth rate.
(b) Unemployment rate (15-64).
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tered to 3,000 households during December 2010 - March 2011. This paper contributes
to the existing literature because we evaluate a public works program that was deliber-
ately introduced as a social safety net to mitigate the impact of a very sharp decline in
economic activity. To our knowledge, the only other evaluations of crisis-inspired pub-
lic works programs are found in Latin America, in Argentina (Jalan and Ravallion,
2003, Galasso and Ravallion 2004) and Peru (Chacaltana, 2003).
The key findings of this paper are threefold. First, the Latvian public works program
increased household incomes by 37 percent relative to similar households not benefit-
ing from the program. The increased incomes helped households to cope with the crisis
significantly better than identical households that were not in the public works pro-
gram. Second, the income that households had to forego was low, and some of the in-
come that was foregone is accounted for by a loss of other safety net payments,
suggesting that the public works program did not replace other labor market opportun-
ities. The program increased household income by LVL 67 while the actual public
works payment was LVL 100 per month. Third, the public works program targeted
poorer households very well, meaning that the design parameters in the public works
program performed as expected. Two key design parameters were the relatively low sti-
pend and the labor intensive work requirement led to the good targeting performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section Context and program
description presents the context in which the Latvian public works program was intro-
duced and describes the program; Section Data describes the data used in this paper;
Section Methodology outlines the quasi-experimental estimation strategy employed
to evaluate the public works program; Section Results presents results, namely the
program impacts on participant household welfare and the targeting performance
of the program; and Section Conclusion concludes.
1.1 Context and program description
During 2008–2010, as the global financial crisis unfolded in Latvia, gross domestic
product (GDP) contracted by 21 percent. Between 2008 and 2009 alone, Latvia’s GDP
contracted by 18 percent (Figure 1a). Labor market conditions also worsened and the
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relative low rates of about 5 percent to about 7.5 percent prior to the crisis to a record
high of 21 percent in Q1 2010 (Figure 1b).
Prior to the crisis in Latvia, there were two main social safety net instruments to help
people affected by an income shock – the unemployment insurance scheme and the
poverty targeted social safety net scheme. However, these social safety nets were inad-
equate when confronting the broad and deep crisis of 2008–2010. With unemployment
insurance, the main inadequacy was that there were about 40 percent of workers laid-
off during the crisis who were not eligible for unemployment benefits, primarily be-
cause they failed to meet the requirement of having paid nine months of contributions
into the unemployment insurance fund in a 12-month period.3 With the poverty
targeted social safety net programs, the main inadequacy was that the programs only
covered a small fraction of the population (less than 2.5 percent of the total population,
and 5.2 percent of households in the bottom quintile were covered).4
The goal of the Latvian public works program was to reduce the severity of the social
consequences of the global financial crisis on Latvians by providing temporary labor-
intensive jobs to people who expressed an interest in the program by signing up on the
waiting list. Central government expenditures on the public works program amounted
to about LVL 8.0 (US$16) million in 2009; LVL 27 (US$54) million in 2010; and LVL
20 (US$40) million in 2011 (Government of Latvia, 2011).5 During 2010 and 2011,
Government expenditures amounted to about 0.25 percent of GDP, or 2.0 to 2.5 times
expenditures on the main poverty-targeted social assistance program, the Guaranteed
Minimum Income program (World Bank, 2010). The public works program created al-
most 123,000 temporary jobs over 2009–11.6
The emergency public works program was open to anyone who was registered
unemployed but not receiving unemployment benefits and signed up for the pro-
gram.7 The program participants were eligible to participate for up to six months
with a two week minimum requirement and jobs were provided on a first-come,
first-served basis. There was no limit to the number of times a worker could bene-
fit from the public works program, but re-entry into the program required signing
up on the waiting list.8
The Latvian public works program was rationed through a self-targeting mechanism
with two main components. First, a relatively low stipend was offered to public works
participants to ensure that non-poor people would not crowd out poorer people in the
program. Participants earned a stipend of about 80 percent of the binding net mini-
mum monthly wage, or LVL 100 per month (about €142 or US$200).9 The stipend of
LVL 100 was not subject to taxes or social contributions and all program participants
were automatically insured against work-related accidents. Second, public works tasks
were labor-intensive, which also dissuaded non-poor people from participating. The
program required that the ratio of labor costs to material and tool costs be about 80
percent; therefore, some maintenance activities were viable, but few if any asset-
creation activities qualified. Public works opportunities included public infrastructure
maintenance, environmental clean-up, social services (through civil society organiza-
tions), and municipal and state services (excluding municipal and state enterprises). In
some cases, the program also included a small training component that aimed to im-
prove skills to perform public works tasks.
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target group (Grosh et al. 2008). Naturally, they also economize the administrative re-
sources required to implement the program. With the Latvian WWS program, the low
stipend together with the requirement that 80 percent of the program budget be dedi-
cated to labor costs means that the program was relatively cost effective. Subbarao
et al. (2012) reviews data from 77 public works programs in 62 countries and find that
63 percent of the programs assigned a high labor cost share of 60 percent or higher,
while the remaining programs were less labor intensive. This evidence suggests that the
Latvia program was amongst the more cost effective public works programs in the
world. However, a full cost-effectiveness analysis will require more information on ad-
ministrative costs, which are notoriously difficult to find in most countries, partly be-
cause existing physical and human resources are used to implement the public works
program and hence, it is difficult to assign a cost share to the program.
The program was implemented throughout Latvia and administered by all 28 State
Employment Affiliates (SEAs). Municipalities supervised the works and in some cases,
non-governmental organizations partnered in the activities. The availability of jobs
depended on each municipality’s ability to create “new” jobs rather than transfer previ-
ously funded functions to the public works program. This requirement proved challen-
ging in Latvia because municipalities outsource several activities and the public works’
central financing structure was an incentive for municipalities to transfer regular muni-
cipal functions to the public works budget.10 To ensure that public works positions
were newly created, the Government provided municipalities with technical assistance
to illustrate tasks that were eligible for program support. In addition, the central
Government followed up with inspections to ensure compliance.
2 Data
This paper uses data from a unique household survey, henceforth referred to as the
WWS Household Survey, commissioned by the Latvian State Employment Agency and
fielded during December 2010-March 2011.11 The sample of WWS Household Survey
respondents is representative of all Latvians who were eligible for the public works pro-
gram, meaning that they were registered as unemployed persons. All five regions of
Latvia - Kurzemes, Latgale, Riga, Vidzemes, and Zemgales - were sampled. We focus
on data from the registered unemployed population from two strata within each region:
Strata 1: people enrolled in the emergency public works program (Treatment)
Strata 2: people on the waiting list for the emergency public works program (Control)
A random sample of 1,166 people was drawn from Strata 1 (Treatment) and a random sam-
ple of 1,016 people was drawn from Strata 2 (Control).12
In this paper, we refer to individuals who were originally selected from the list of reg-
istered unemployed persons through random sampling as assigned individuals. The sur-
vey was conducted through face-to-face interviews and collected information on all
members of the assigned individual’s household.
The household survey questionnaire resembles other labor force surveys in Latvia
and includes questions on education, employment status of household members,
household expenditures, asset ownership, and detailed questions for public works partici-
pants. Due to the time lapse between sampling (November, 2010) and the actual inter-
views (December, 2010 – March, 2011), about 396 assigned persons in the Treatment
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Control group began participating in the program. To avoid any contamination bias, we
drop those assigned persons who have a different status than actually assigned.13 In
addition, about 64 assigned persons in the Treatment group have an additional household
member enrolled in the public works program besides the assigned individual. We drop
these assigned individuals to avoid possible over estimation of the impact of the program
on household welfare. Similarly, we drop 22 assigned workers from the Control group be-
cause another household member was enrolled in the program. The final sample size used
in the analysis is: Treatment - 721; Control - 769.14
Omitting some of the assigned individuals (from Treatment and Control) to avoid con-
tamination bias raises concerns about selection bias. However, as shown in Table 1, we re-
ject this concern because we do not find significant differences in the characteristics of
individuals who are dropped from the Treatment group from characteristics of those
remaining in the Treatment group. Similarly, with the Control group, we find significant
differences only in 2 out of 28 characteristics between individuals from the Control group
who are dropped and those who remain in the Control group. Hence, dropping observa-
tions to avoid contamination bias does not introduce a significant selection bias.15
The WWS Household Survey collected household income information through mul-
tiple techniques, but our preferred technique is the one that collected income, includ-
ing the program stipend, through a series of questions posed to households about
income components.16 Although the survey collected information on the program sti-
pend, it did not collect information on the duration that a person received the stipend
payments.17 Nevertheless, 99 percent of public works recipients report that they re-
ceived their full pay and hence, we added the LVL 100 for individuals in the public
works program (and LVL 0 for households in the Control group) to household monthly
income to get total monthly household income. There are marginal differences in aver-
age incomes based on the two income definitions (reported in Table 2).
3 Methodology
3.1 Targeting performance
To assess the targeting performance of the public works program, we identify the loca-
tion of beneficiary households in the welfare distribution of the Latvian population.
However, by design, the WWS Household Survey represents only the registered un-
employed population and hence, the ranking of WWS Household Survey respondents
in the overall population is not immediately known. We therefore combine the WWS
Household Survey data with quintile cut-offs from the 2009 Household Budget Survey
(HBS). Because the HBS is representative of the entire Latvian population, the quintile
cut-offs generated from that household welfare distribution can be used to determine
the quintile to which the WWS Household Survey respondents belong. Thereby, we as-
sess the targeting performance of the public works program during the crisis.
3.2 Program impact
This section describes the methodology used to measure the short-term impact of the
WWS program on household income. A quasi-experimental design is employed in the
evaluation by exploiting the excess demand that prevailed throughout the implementation
of the program. This excess demand led to a persistent waiting list of people who were














Difference T-Stat Difference T-Stat
Age 18-24 −0.004 (−0.25) −0.046 (−1.83)
Age 25-29 0.004 (0.23) −0.004 (−0.18)
Age 30-39 0.024 (1.00) 0.050 (1.90)
Male 0.047 (1.56) −0.035 (−0.96)
Household head 0.006 (0.23) 0.022 (0.63)
Spouse of
household head
−0.032 (−1.34) −0.008 (−0.29)
Single 0.025 (1.02) −0.057 (−1.82)
Married 0.042 (1.45) −0.035 (−1.05)
Share of members
in age 0-5
−0.459 (−0.65) −0.931 (−0.95)
Share of members
in age 6-17
0.525 (0.48) 1.089 (0.77)
Share of members
in age 1864
−0.368 (−0.25) 0.966 (0.53)
Household size 0.043 (0.44) 0.013 (0.12)
Unemployed
12 months ago
0.045 (1.48) −0.066 (−1.82)
Secondary
education
−0.004 (−0.15) −0.011 (−0.34)
Secondary
profession
−0.026 (−0.90) −0.000 (−0.00)
Higher education 0.026 (1.77) −0.050** (−2.74)
Own a flat 0.007 (0.25) −0.023 (−0.64)
Own a house −0.033 (−1.57) 0.014 (0.66)
House is owned by
state
0.011 (0.43) 0.070* (2.26)
House is owned by
private entity




0.002 (0.11) 0.011 (0.56)
House have 1
room
0.008 (0.30) −0.013 (−0.42)
2 room −0.018 (−0.61) 0.060 (1.67)
3 room 0.038 (1.46) −0.030 (−0.95)
Detached/semi-
detached House
0.012 (0.39) −0.005 (−0.14)
Flat in apartment −0.007 (−0.70) −0.018 (−1.68)
Wooden wall 0.015 (0.62) 0.105*** (3.46)




Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2 Household monthly income, definitions







Income Monthly aggregate income calculated




Monthly aggregate income reported
by household (LVL)
237 202 220
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cially who were similar to program participants in their preference for the program. In
other words, people on the waiting list had to some extent revealed unobserved factors
influencing their choice to participate (Glasasso and Ravallion 2004).
However, latent heterogeneity between WWS participants and those on the WWS
waiting list may still bias impact estimates. As WWS enrolment is on a first-come,
first-served basis, the possibility remains that those individuals who were more likely to
be impacted by any crisis are first to register for the program and the first to participate
in the program. To control for observable heterogeneity, propensity score matching is
used to construct a counterfactual outcome from the sample of individuals on the
waiting list. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) we use propensity score matching
(PSM) to estimate outcomes without the program (i.e., the average outcome for indi-
viduals who did not participate in the WWS program) and compare that outcome
to the outcome for observationally similar participants in terms of their propensity
to participate in the WWS program. Propensity is estimated using Prob(Ti = 1|Xi),
i.e., probability of participating (Ti = 1) in the WWS program conditional on ob-
served (pre-determined) covariates, Xi.
Although propensity score matching controls for observable differences, it does not rule
out the possibility of selection bias due to unobserved differences between participants and
even a well-matched control group. We use Rosenbaum bounds (Rosenbaum, 2002) to as-
sess the sensitivity of our results to the selection on unobservables. In the interest of brev-
ity, and because Rosenbaum bounds have become more widely used in econometric
analyses of program evaluation, we have omitted the formal details. Instead, we note that
the objective of the method is to obtain bounds on the significance level of a one-sided test
for no treatment effect under different assumptions concerning the role of unobservables
in the treatment selection process. Specifically, we report upper bounds on the p-value of
the null of zero average treatment effect on different values of Γ, where Γ reflects the rela-
tive odds ratio of two observationally identical persons participating in the WWS program.
Thus, Γ is one in a randomized experiment or in non-experimental data free of bias from
selection on unobservables; higher values of Γ imply an increasingly important role of un-
observables. For example, Γ = 2 implies that observationally identical persons can differ by
a factor of two in their relative odds of participating in WWS program.
4 Results
4.1 Targeting performance
One of the crucial goals of the Latvian emergency public works program was to target
poor households. We find that 80 percent of beneficiaries are poor, meaning that their
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A of Table 3).18,19 Almost 83 percent of public works beneficiaries are in the bottom 20
percent of the welfare distribution and 96 percent of program beneficiaries are in the
bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution. The targeting performance of the Latvian
public works program is very good in comparison to other public works programs that
have been assessed around the world. Jalan and Ravallion (2003) find that 75–85 per-
cent of participants in the Trabajar program (considered a well-targeted program) in
Argentina were poor.
Conversely, in the Latvia public works program, leakage of benefits to non-poor
households is low. About one-fifth of enrolled beneficiaries are non-needy, meaning
that their incomes exceed the needy line income of LVL 90 per person per month. Al-
ternately, less than five percent of all program beneficiaries are in the top 40 percent of
the welfare distribution.
All five regions of Latvia perform well in terms of targeting, although targeting
performance varies across regions (Panel B of Table 3). Importantly, targeting per-
formance is good in poor regions, such as Latgale. The WWS program targeting
performance remains robust to alternative indicators of welfare. For example, most
WWS beneficiaries are less educated (highest educational attainment is basic
or secondary level), and only a few university graduates report participating in








Richest Poor Non-poor Total
Panel A: Latvia
Treatment-Currently in WWS 83.0 13.0 2.1 1.5 0.4 80.2 19.8 100
Control-On waiting list for WWS 76.6 15.7 3.2 3.4 1.1 73.2 26.8 100
Panel B: Regions
Kurzemes
Treatment -Currently in WWS 82.9 11.9 2.9 2.4 0.0 80.8 19.3 100
Control-On waiting list for WWS 72.3 19.6 3.8 3.8 0.5 68.8 31.2 100
Latgale
Treatment -Currently in WWS 87.7 8.6 2.5 1.2 0.0 87.7 12.4 100
Control-On waiting list for WWS 79.0 14.0 2.6 4.4 0.0 76.5 23.5 100
Riga
Treatment -Currently in WWS 80.5 14.3 3.0 1.5 0.8 75.7 24.3 100
Control-On waiting list for WWS 72.3 16.2 4.7 3.7 3.1 66.2 33.9 100
Vidzemes
Treatment -Currently in WWS 80.5 16.7 1.2 0.6 1.2 77.8 22.2 100
Control-On waiting list for WWS 81.0 13.9 2.2 2.2 0.7 79.6 20.4 100
Zemgales
Treatment -Currently in WWS 87.6 10.7 0.8 0.8 0.0 83.7 16.3 100
Control-On waiting list for WWS 83.7 12.2 1.6 2.4 0.0 81.6 18.4 100
Note: Per capita income is calculated without WWS stipend. A household is considered poor if its per capita income
(without WWS stipend) is less than LVL 90 per month. The quintiles cut-offs are derived using the income distribution of
Household Budget Survey-2009 (the inflation between 2009 and 2010 has been about zero, hence no adjustment is
made in HBS-2009 cut offs).
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As discussed earlier, we believe that workers in the control group are similar to those
workers in treatment group. The plausibility of the Conditional Independence Assump-
tion (CIA) in PSM crucially relies on matching treated and control units on the basis of
a large and informative set of pre-treatment variables.21 The variables of interest, sum-
marized in Table 4, contain detailed information on demographic characteristics, edu-
cational attainment, family background, and the unemployment status twelve months
prior to the survey.22 According to Heckman et al. (2009), when evaluating government
sponsored training programs, the most important criterion are that outcome variables
should be measured in the same way for both participants and non-participants; that
members of treatment and control groups should be drawn from the local laborTable 4 Difference in ex-ante variables, before matching
Mean Treatment = Control
Variable Treatment Control % bias t p > t
Age 18-24 0.094 0.149 −17.0 −3.27 0.00
Age 25-29 0.066 0.084 −6.9 −1.34 0.18
Age 30-39 0.178 0.139 10.7 2.07 0.04
Male 0.383 0.468 −17.3 −3.34 0.00
Household head 0.680 0.678 0.5 0.10 0.92
Spouse of household head 0.204 0.153 13.3 2.56 0.01
Single 0.193 0.252 −14.2 −2.74 0.01
Married 0.331 0.313 3.8 0.74 0.46
Share of members in age 0-5 5.040 6.531 −11.7 −2.25 0.02
Share of members in age 6-17 10.799 10.802 0.0 0.00 1.00
Share of members in age 1864 78.453 77.219 5.0 0.96 0.34
Household size 2.884 2.881 0.2 0.04 0.97
Unemployed 12 months ago 0.439 0.466 −5.3 −1.02 0.31
Secondary education 0.307 0.278 6.3 1.22 0.22
Secondary profession 0.390 0.389 0.1 0.02 0.98
Higher education 0.051 0.075 −10.0 −1.92 0.06
Own a flat 0.343 0.364 −4.4 −0.85 0.40
Own a house 0.152 0.096 16.8 3.24 0.00
House is owned by state 0.240 0.222 4.3 0.82 0.41
House is owned by private entity 0.132 0.185 −14.4 −2.77 0.01
Have other Dwelling in other parts of Latvia 0.084 0.075 3.3 0.63 0.53
House have 1 room 0.229 0.232 −0.8 −0.16 0.87
2 room 0.416 0.416 0.1 0.02 0.99
3 room 0.227 0.251 −5.5 −1.06 0.29
Detached/semi-detached House 0.417 0.437 −3.9 −0.75 0.45
Flat in apartment 0.025 0.025 −0.2 −0.03 0.97
Wooden wall 0.198 0.198 0.1 0.02 0.98
concrete wall 0.227 0.252 −5.8 −1.11 0.27
region==Latgale 0.112 0.149 −11.2 −2.14 0.03
region==Riga 0.186 0.256 −16.9 −3.25 0.00
region==Vidzemes 0.242 0.181 15.1 2.92 0.00
region==Zemgales 0.167 0.165 0.5 0.09 0.93
Note: Standardized bias (SB) for each variable is defined as the difference of sample means in the treated and control
subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups.
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force status prior to enrollment (Mueser et al. 2007).
In our case, the information was collected with the same questionnaire for both the
treatment and control groups, which were drawn from the same local labor market.
We capture the local labor market conditions by including a dummy variable for the
region where the individual lives. However, the only measure available in our data iden-
tifying prior employment activity is an indicator of whether the individual was un-
employed 12 months prior to the survey. If individuals who sign up sooner for the
program are those with less stable work histories, even after measured characteristics
(and the unemployment indicator) are held constant, bias could persist.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for our treatment and control groups. Based on
32 ex ante variables, we find statistically significant differences for 11 variables: age,
gender, relationship to head of household, share of household members in 0–5 age
range, home ownership, or living in a house held by private entity, and each of the five
regional dummy variables. These findings suggest that although the assigned individ-
uals in the treatment and control groups have characteristics that are statistically simi-
lar, they also differ significantly in some observed characteristics. Therefore, we control
for observed differences before comparing outcomes of WWS participants and non-
participants.
To control for observable heterogeneity, we adopt a propensity score matching tech-
nique to construct a counterfactual outcome from the sample of individuals on the
waiting list. First, we estimated a probit model for calibrating the propensity score on
the pooled sample of assigned individuals in the treatment and control groups. The
complete model is reported in Table 5. The explanatory power of the model is low,
suggesting that the two groups of individuals are similar with respect to many observed
characteristics. Most explanatory variables have insignificant coefficients; while geog-
raphy, gender, relationship to household head, share of household members in 0–5 age
range, and higher education have significant impacts on WWS participation.23 Propen-
sity score results confirm our expectations from the simple averages reported in Table 4,
as there are no differences in simple averages of many characteristics, and they are in-
significant in the propensity score model.
As expected, we find considerable overlap in support between the treatment and con-
trol groups (Figure 2). Table 6 explores whether the model has balanced all ex ante var-
iables, i.e., we calculate differences between treatment and control groups for each
characteristic in the matched sample. Conditioning variables are balanced, as indicated
by the t-tests in Table 6, Panel A. Matching balances differences observed in the raw
data; in the matched sample, all differences between the treatment and control groups
are insignificant. Matching also significantly reduces standardized bias. In most empir-
ical studies, a standardized bias below three percent, or five percent after matching, is
acceptable (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In our case, the standardized bias is below
three percent for almost all covariates. We report another test in Table 6, Panel B.
Following Sianesi (2004), we re-estimated the propensity score on the matched
sample, i.e., only on participants and matched nonparticipants, and compare the
pseudo-R2 before and after matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regres-
sors explain the probability of participation. After matching, no systematic differ-
ences should exist in the covariate distribution between the two groups, therefore
Table 5 Probit for calibrating propensity score
Coefficient Standard error
Age 18-24 −0.172 (0.135)
Age 25-29 −0.020 (0.146)
Age 30-39 0.171 (0.105)
Male −0.198*** (0.071)
Household head 0.268** (0.120)
Spouse of household head 0.413*** (0.144)
Single −0.057 (0.101)
Married −0.077 (0.085)
Share of members in age 0-5 −0.009** (0.004)
Share of members in age 6-17 −0.004 (0.003)
Share of members in age 1864 0.000 (0.002)
Household size 0.063* (0.034)
Unemployed 12 months ago −0.067 (0.068)
Secondary education 0.034 (0.094)
Secondary profession −0.009 (0.093)
Higher education −0.291* (0.155)
Own a flat −0.024 (0.177)
Own a house 0.287** (0.143)
House is owned by state −0.006 (0.133)
House is owned by private entity −0.193 (0.143)
Have other Dwelling in other parts of Latvia 0.107 (0.124)
House have 1 room 0.056 (0.144)
2 room 0.016 (0.129)
3 room −0.111 (0.127)
Detached/semi-detached House −0.003 (0.133)
Flat in apartment −0.102 (0.237)
Wooden wall −0.113 (0.093)






Number of observations 1,484
Pseudo R-Square 0.0417
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Azam et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 11 of 212013, 2:10
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after matching.
The diagnostic analysis reveals that matching controls for the small differences ob-
served in the unmatched data. In Table 7, we present the average impact of the WWS
program on short-term household incomes.24 We use kernel matching (KM), which is
a nonparametric matching estimator that uses weighted averages of (nearly) all - de-
pending on the choice of the kernel function - individuals in the control group to con-
struct the counterfactual outcome.25 Thus, a key advantage is the lower variance, which
is achieved because more information is used.
.2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Figure 2 Overlapping support in the distribution of the propensity score. Note: Histogram of
propensity score distribution for WWS participants and WWS waiting list; 3 (0.2%) of the participants are off
the common support.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/10Households in the treatment group have an average monthly income of LVL 248.5
while households in control group have an average monthly income of LVL 181.5
(Table 7). Hence, the WWS program increases household’s income by about 37 per-
cent. We conclude, therefore, that the WWS program acted as an effective short-run
safety net (i.e., during program enrollment).
Participation in the WWS program transferred a nominal amount of LVL 100 each
month to the household. However, it is important to look beyond the net transfers from
the program (wage or stipend) because public works beneficiaries must forgo some in-
come to participate in the program, which requires a time commitment from partici-
pants. The value of forgone income depends on the national context – including the
prevailing market conditions, household labor-supply decisions, and access to safety
nets.26 For example, using a quasi-experimental approach, Jalan and Ravallion (2003)
show that in Argentina’s Trabajar program, the average net gain to public works partici-
pants was about half of the gross wage. Glasasso and Ravallion (2004) found that in
Argentina’s Trabajar and Plan Jefes y Jefas programs, a large share of participants were
women who would not otherwise have participated in the labor force. Therefore, under
the Trabajar and Plan Jefes y Jefas programs, about half of the employment gain came
from unemployed workers, and the other half arose from inactive workforce partici-
pants. Chacaltana (2003) found that the net gain derived from the Trabajar Urbano
program in Peru was equal to 24 percent of the nominal transfer. Beneficiaries received
a monthly salary of 300 soles, while their control group was able to generate 227 soles
on their own, in the absence of the program. In the Empleo in Action program in
Colombia, participant monthly employment income increased on average close to 39
Table 6 Balancing tests: difference in ex-ante variables after matching
Panel A
Mean % reduction Treatment = Control
Variable Treated Control % SB |SB| t p > t
Age 18-24 0.095 0.104 −3.0 82.2 −0.62 0.53
Age 25-29 0.065 0.071 −2.3 67.5 −0.45 0.66
Age 30-39 0.175 0.169 1.7 83.9 0.32 0.75
Male 0.385 0.392 −1.4 92.2 −0.26 0.80
Household head 0.684 0.675 2.0 −303.8 0.38 0.70
Spouse of household head 0.199 0.196 0.8 94.1 0.14 0.89
Single 0.195 0.201 −1.5 89.6 −0.29 0.77
Married 0.328 0.333 −1.0 74.9 −0.18 0.86
Share of members in age 0-5 5.066 5.322 −2.0 82.8 −0.41 0.68
Share of members in age 6-17 10.637 10.691 −0.3 −1543.1 −0.06 0.96
Share of members in age 1864 78.533 78.316 0.9 82.4 0.17 0.87
Household size 2.873 2.909 −2.4 −1077.0 −0.44 0.66
Unemployed 12 months ago 0.440 0.445 −1.1 78.5 −0.22 0.83
Secondary education 0.309 0.306 0.7 89.4 0.12 0.90
Secondary profession 0.389 0.388 0.4 −184.8 0.07 0.95
Higher education 0.051 0.054 −0.9 91.3 −0.18 0.86
Own a flat 0.344 0.358 −3.0 32.6 −0.57 0.57
Own a house 0.150 0.139 3.4 80.0 0.59 0.55
House is owned by state 0.241 0.233 1.8 58.2 0.34 0.74
House is owned by private entity 0.134 0.136 −0.6 96.1 −0.11 0.91
Have other Dwelling in other
parts of Latvia
0.082 0.085 −1.0 69.6 −0.18 0.85
House have 1 room 0.229 0.222 1.8 −113.4 0.34 0.73
3 room 0.416 0.420 −0.9 −952.1 −0.17 0.87
4 room 0.227 0.239 −2.8 49.4 −0.53 0.60
Detached/semi-detached House 0.419 0.431 −2.6 34.3 −0.49 0.63
Flat in apartment 0.025 0.025 −0.3 −57.6 −0.05 0.96
Wooden wall 0.200 0.203 −0.6 −417.3 −0.11 0.91
concrete wall 0.229 0.239 −2.2 62.8 −0.41 0.68
region==Latgale 0.111 0.118 −2.0 82.5 −0.39 0.70
region==Riga 0.188 0.188 −0.1 99.7 −0.01 0.99
region==Vidzemes 0.238 0.232 1.3 91.1 0.25 0.81
region==Zemgales 0.168 0.174 −1.5 −226.8 −0.29 0.77
Panel B
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p > chi2
Unmatched 0.042 85.8 0.0
Matched 0.001 2.97 1.0
Note: Standardized bias (SB) for each variable is defined as the difference of sample means in the treated and control
subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups. Reduction in bias
refers to the percentage reduction in bias after matching.
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for women (90 percent) and for youth between 18 and 25 year old (54 percent)
(Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, Colombia, 2004). Datt and Ravallion (1994)
found that other family members took up displaced productive activities when someone
joined a workfare program in rural India.
Table 7 Average impact of WWS on incomes
Matched Bootstrap Normal-based






























92.23 73.11 19.13 2.71 0.00 13.82 24.43
Note: The standard errors are derived via bootstrapping with 100 replications.
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about LVL 67 per month, which is about two-thirds of the WWS stipend (LVL 100 per
month). Thus, forgone income is only about LVL 33.27 We calculate the average gains
in WWS program based on other matching estimators (Table 8), but we find similar
gains. Thus, the net gain from the WWS program is not sensitive to the choice of the
estimator.
The forgone income in the WWS program is lower than forgone income estimates
for public works programs in other countries. In other words, the control group was
unable to generate income, likely because of a lack of labor market opportunities,
which was also reflected in record high unemployment rates; and because of the low
coverage and benefits of poverty-targeted social assistance programs.28 However, some
forgone income can be explained by the loss of other safety net income for participants,
e.g., guaranteed minimum income (GMI). For example, households in the treatment
group earn LVL 6 less (LVL 4) from GMI (unemployment benefits) compared to house-







Caliper (б = 0.001) 67.55
(11.00)
Caliper (б = 0.01) 64.72
(9.57)
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis, and are derived via bootstrapping with 100 replications.










Labor income 68.0 94.6 −26.6 7.5 −3.6
Income from WWS 100.0 0.0 100.0 - -
Income from informal sources 3.5 4.6 −1.1 0.9 −1.2
Income from other sources 7.5 8.3 −0.8 2.3 −0.4




4.2 9.8 −5.6 1.5 −3.8
Housing Allowance 1.2 2.4 −1.2 0.7 −1.7
Heating Allowance 3.9 4.1 −0.2 1.1 −0.2
School Meals 1.8 3.0 −1.3 0.7 −1.7
Other municipal assistance 1.6 1.4 0.1 1.0 0.2
Children’s Allowance 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.2
Parental/maternal Benefit 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 −0.1
State Family Benefit 5.4 5.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Other family state benefit 1.2 2.3 −1.1 0.7 −1.5
Unemployment Benefit 0.4 4.0 −3.6 0.8 −4.5
Sickness Benefit 0.5 1.0 −0.5 0.5 −0.9
Disability Benefit 3.6 2.5 1.1 1.1 0.9
Other state benefit 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.3
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households choose WWS, they lose top-up benefits such as those available under GMI.
However, municipalities in Latvia might encourage WWS participation because the
WWS costs are borne entirely by the central government, whereas municipal govern-
ments co-finance GMI benefits. Also, the work requirement makes the safety net polit-
ically appealing.
In addition to looking at the WWS program impact on income gains; we also look at
the impact of public works on the type of coping strategies adopted by the households
during the crisis (Table 10). In the questionnaire, each household was asked whether
they adopted any of the strategies to cope with the recent crisis, and a number of com-
mon coping strategies were enumerated with the option of yes or no.29 As households
in both treatment and control groups were affected by the crisis, they reported that
they adopted multiple coping strategies to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Table 10
presents the impact of the WWS program on the adoption of different coping strat-
egies.30 Interestingly, a household in the treatment group is less likely to adopt any cop-
ing strategy compared with a similar household in the control group. The WWS
program impact on nutrition and health outcomes is particularly noteworthy: a lower
proportion of households participating in WWS reported reducing their food intake
(quantity and frequency), or reducing doctor visits (preventive and during illness) than
households in the control group.31
4.2.1 Sensitivity of the PSM estimates to the unobservables
Although the PSM estimation controls for selection of observables, any selection of un-
observables can bias the results. We assess the sensitivity of our results to the selection
of unobservables using Rosenbaum bounds. Table 11 reports the upper bound on the
Table 10 Coping strategy adopted by Treatment and Control households




Reduced consumption of food staple −7.31 2.70
Skipped meals −8.12
Reduced lighting/heating/water consumption −5.73 2.13
Reduced entertainment consumption −2.04 0.78
Bought less clothes −3.62 1.40
Withdrew preschool kid −1.08 1.39
Withdrew from university −0.21 0.24
Withdrew from training classes −0.97 0.86
Reduced educational expenditures −0.64 0.39
Reduced doctor’s appointments (preventive) −6.68 2.61
Reduced doctor’s appointments (when ill) −3.54 1.36
Stopped buying medicine −5.14 1.99
Cancelled phone service −3.21 2.26
Postponed investments in business −1.13 1.05
Reduced help to friends −3.36 1.95
Cut TV service −4.23 3.25
Change transportation mode −1.49 1.26
Cut internet service 0.28 0.21
Note: The difference is the difference in percentage of the households in Treatment and Control group reporting using
the particular strategy as a response to crisis.
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upper bound on the p-value is less than, say, 0.10 for reasonably large values of Γ, then
the treatment effect is said to be robust to hidden bias. We find the income gains to be
sensitive to hidden bias only if Γ is larger than 2. While the Rosenbaum bounds do not
yield point estimates of the treatment effects once hidden bias is taken into account,
they increase confidence in WWS program impacts because the positive impact of the
WWS program on income is robust to a large selection bias of unobservables.
5 Conclusion
Latvia was one of the hardest hit countries during the 2008–2010 global financial crisis.
GDP contracted by 18 percent in 2009; poverty rates increased by about 8.0 percentage
points in 2009; and in 2010 Q1, the unemployment rate was about three times the pre-
crisis unemployment rate. To mitigate the impact of the crisis on poor households, the
Government of Latvia introduced an emergency public works program targeting regis-
tered unemployed people who were not receiving unemployment benefits. Between Q3
2009 and end-2011, the public works program created almost 123,000 temporary jobs.Table 11 Sensitivity of PSM estimates with respect to unobservables, Rosenbaum
Bounds
Income
Г 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.092 0.375
Note: Rosenbaum critical p-values for test of the null of zero average treatment effect on treated (ATT). For controls
included in the propensity score, see Table 5.
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the emergency public works program using a unique household survey collected be-
tween December 2010 and March 2011.
This paper employs a quasi-experimental design to measure the program impact.
More specifically, we exploit the excess demand for the program that prevailed
throughout the implementation of the emergency public works program in Latvia to
construct a counterfactual group. Using a propensity score matching (PSM) method,
we find that the program increased household incomes by 37 percent relative to similar
households not benefiting from the program. The program increased household in-
comes by LVL 67 per month while the actual payment was LVL 100 per month. Thus,
participants had to forego about LVL 33 per month to participate in the program;
some of this foregone income is due to the loss of other safety net payments such
as guaranteed minimum income benefits. Foregone income due to program partici-
pation is lower than foregone incomes estimated elsewhere; likely because alternate
income-generating options were limited during the crisis because of a lack of labor
market opportunities, which was also reflected in record high unemployment rates;
and because of the low coverage and benefits of poverty-targeted social assistance
programs.
The Latvian public works program experience highlights the usefulness of public
works as a safety net during times of labor market crises. For policymakers and devel-
opment experts interested in public works programs, this evaluation raises some points
worth considering when designing a program. First, setting the stipend level below the
binding minimum wage and making participants engage in labor-intensive activities in-
creases the chances of good targeting performance. These conditions make the pro-
gram only attractive to poor people, and non-poor people are unlikely to apply for the
program. In effect, the public works program becomes a more effective self-targeting
program. Self-targeting is particularly useful when fast scale up is needed during times
of crises, and knowledge of household welfare is not well known to policymakers.
Second, timing public works programs to coincide with spikes in unemployment
(shocks, low seasons) can help people during periods when other employment oppor-
tunities are limited and alternative income sources are low. In other words, public
works can be a good means of fortifying a country’s existing safety net. Third, public
works programs during times of crises can help families maintain nutrition and health,
thus preventing longer-term problems that might result from reducing food intake or
foregoing medical visits. While the past literature has focused on the monetary benefits
of safety nets during crises, a well-designed public works program during a crisis can
also help households maintain their nutritional intake and can help them continue
health checkups and health care.
Endnotes
1 Lats is the currency of Latvia, and 1 Lat was US$2 and €1.41 on March 31, 2011.
2 Prior to the crisis and relative to its neighbors, Latvia allocated a very small share of
social welfare spending to programs designed to target the poorest households. The
low spending on poverty-targeted benefits resulted in low coverage indicators-–about
six percent of households in the poorest quintile were covered by poverty-targeted
safety nets (World Bank, 2010).
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/103 Although the proportion of unemployed workers who were not eligible for un-
employment benefits varied over time because of variations in proportions meeting the
eligibility requirements, as the crisis dragged on, the proportion of people not meeting
the unemployment benefit eligibility requirements rose to more than 50 percent. This
occurred as workers became increasingly involved in short-term and part-time employ-
ment as the crisis offered few other opportunities (Hazans, 2012). As a result, the re-
quirement that workers complete nine months of unemployment insurance
contributions in a 12-month period prior to qualifying for unemployment benefits was
increasingly unmet.
4 World Bank (2010) reports that the two main poverty targeted social safety net pro-
grams are the Guaranteed Minimum Income and the Housing Benefit programs.
5 On March 31, 2011 the exchange rate was: €1.00: US$1.42: LVL 0.704.
6 There is significant variation in the duration of participation in the program, with
some participants completing a few days and others completing six months in the pro-
gram. Also, some program beneficiaries re-enlisted into the program and hence, only
75,000 people benefited from the emergency public works program while 122,000 jobs
were created.
7 Registered unemployed could also chose the program instead of unemployment
benefits if unemployment benefits were less than the program stipend.
8 After completing six months in a year, a beneficiary can re-register for the program,
but they are placed at the bottom of the waiting list.
9 Despite initial opposition to what was believed to be a low stipend, the public works
program was always oversubscribed, and the program waiting list was almost double
the number of available positions. No doubt a lower stipend would have resulted in a
shorter waiting list, but Government set the rate at LVL 100 to maintain political sup-
port for the program. In July 2011, the stipend was reduced to LVL 80 per person per
month as the Government started to phase the program out.
10 Municipalities outsourcing is particularly common among the larger and wealthier
municipalities.
11 The field work for the survey was carried out by GfK Custom Research Baltic.
12 In addition to Strata 1 and Strata 2, the survey also collected information on 500
individuals who were laid off during August-October 2009, and subsequently became
WWS beneficiaries; however, they completed their participation in WWS at least six
months prior to the survey (Strata 3). The survey also collected information on 500 in-
dividuals (Strata 4) who were laid off during August-October 2009 but who did not
register for the WWS program (were not interested in the WWS program). Individuals
in Strata 3 and Strata 4 are excluded from our sample because those individuals are
neither current beneficiaries nor are they individuals who expressed a desire to join the
WWS program at the time of the survey.
13 Contamination bias can occur if individuals in the control group are participants
in the program being evaluated (Mueser et al. 2007). Mueser et al. (2007) only choose
those in control group (ES participants) who were not enrolled in the program (JTPA)
in the program year.
14 We keep only those assigned workers in the Treatment group who have partici-
pated in the program for at least one month. This led to 12 assigned individuals being
dropped from the Treatment group.
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/1015 The two significant characteristics-–higher education and wooden walls in the
household-–do not affect the probability of participation in the program (Table 5) signifi-
cantly. Hence, we believe that the statistical difference in those two variables between the
observations remaining in the control group and being dropped from control group do
not create a significant selection bias. However, by dropping the observations, we are able
to eliminate contamination bias which would have been significant.
16 An additional household income variable is available because households were
asked: “What is the total monthly income of your household at the moment?”
17 It is also not feasible to find out the duration of payment from the time spent in
the program, as the duration of payment will not exactly match the time spent in the
program.
18 A household is defined as poor if its per capita income (before the program sti-
pend) is less than LVL 90 per month. Latvia has no official poverty line but the LVL 90
per capita per month is known as the “needy line”.
19 Households reported that the public works program is useful as a safety net and as
a program to uplift the local community. Most participants view the program as an im-
portant safety net, and 96 percent believe that public works projects are beneficial to
the community.
20 The education distribution among program participants is not surprising given that
public works jobs were physically demanding. Three-quarters of program participants
reported that their public works jobs are physically demanding.
21 The conditional independence assumption (CIA) postulates that given a set of
observed characteristics X = x, the (counterfactual) distribution of outcome of individ-
uals in the treatment group is the same as the (observed) outcome distribution of individ-
uals in the waiting list. A weaker version in terms of conditional mean independence
actually is sufficient.
22 Technically, these variables were recorded at the time of interview; however, we do
not expect these variables to have changed because of participation in short term
WWS program.
23 If the treatment was assigned randomly, none of the covariates is expected to sig-
nificantly affect participation.
24 We use psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) in STATA to get the PSM estimate.
25 To implement the matching estimator, we used the epanechnikov kernel and a fixed
bandwidth of 0.10. Confidence intervals are obtained using 100 bootstrap repetitions.
26 Forgone income is an opportunity cost of participating in the program, i.e., what
the household would have earned if the households had not participated in the pro-
gram. This is unlikely to be zero -- the poor can rarely afford to be idle. As forgone in-
come in not observable once a household starts working in a program, one way is to
assess the forgone income by assessing how much a similar household, which is not
currently participating in the program, is able to earn.
27 Since some income is forgone, the targeting performance reported in the earlier
section (based on zero forgone income) overestimates the WWS program pro-poor
finding.
28 About 83 percent of workers who have participated or are enrolled in the WWS
program report they had to wait; almost 46 percent of workers report waiting six or
more months before participating. Among people who are now waiting, more than
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http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/10three-quarters report waits of three or more months, and about 34 percent have been
waiting for six or more months. This suggests that for many of workers, WWS was the
only opportunity available.
29 See World Bank (2011, chapter 3), for further details on coping strategies adopted
by households in Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries during the recent finan-
cial crisis.
30 In this case our outcome variable is whether a household has adopted that particu-
lar coping strategy or not.
31 Households reported that the WWS program is useful as a safety net and as a pro-
gram to uplift the local community. Most participants view the WWS program as an
important safety net, and 96 percent believe that WWS projects are beneficial to the
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